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Wiley Manuel left his indelible mark as a lawyer, judge, and
man.
The son of a pullman car porter, he began life when the black
man still suffered from a panoply of forms of persecution, both
subtle and overt. It was a time when, as Wiley told me, his friends
would say to him that he would get nothing out of a college degree
because he would end up pumping gas at a service station in any
event. And if Wiley looked around him that prophecy unfortu-
nately in many cases eventuated. Wiley would see that black law-
yers not only were blocked from the large offices but in many ma-
jor cities were even excluded from bar associations. Yet those
obstacles did not stop Wiley from working his way through the
University of California as a hospital orderly and after that, going
to Hastings Law School, graduating at the top of his class, and
becoming Editor-in-Chief of the Hastings Law Journal.
Wiley Manuel began his legal career when in 1953 "Pat"
Brown, then Attorney General, selected him as a member of that
staff. In 1971, he rose to be Chief Assistant Attorney General, as-
suming important supervisory responsibilities, which he excellently
discharged. He became a judge of the Superior Court of Alameda
County in 1976, and in 1977, Governor Jerry Brown appointed him
to the Supreme Court of California.
Justice Manuel served on the Supreme Court for the relatively
brief tenure of three years and nine months. During this period he
authored eighty-three opinions. A review of those opinions con-
firms his reputation as a judicial "moderate," a pragmatist uncom-
mitted to the competing philosophies of the judicial activists or the
judicial conservatives. His opinions reflect, instead, a commitment
to careful analysis of the precise and narrow issues presented by
each particular case.
Perhaps the most significant of Justice Manuel's decisions are
those relating to the diverse fields of real property security and the
rights of criminal defendants. In Garfinkle v. Superior Court1 Jus-
1. 21 Cal. 3d 268, 578 P.2d 925, 146 Cal. Rptr. 208 (1978).
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tice Manuel resolved a long-debated question by concluding for a
unanimous court that nonjudicial foreclosure of trust deeds did not
constitute state action, and thus did not violate due process clauses
of either federal or state Constitutions; the decision is one of the
leading cases of this court exploring the difficult and elusive con-
cept of "state action" when a private party acts pursuant to per-
missive state authority.
Three months later, in Wellenkamp v. Bank of America,2 Jus-
tice Manuel, speaking for a six to one majority, held that enforce-
ment of a due-on-sale clause in a trust deed, when the sale did not
impair the lender's security, constituted an unreasonable restraint
on alienation. In Wellenkamp, a case that was the climax of a line
of decisions dating back to Coast Bank v. Minderhout3 and contin-
uing through La Sala v. American Savings & Loan Association4
and Tucker v. Lassen Savings & Loan Association,5 Justice Ma-
nuel carefully analyzed the impact of enforcement of due-on-sale
clauses. He noted that in times of inflation the enforcement of
such clauses, by preventing a buyer from assuming the balance of a
seller's loan, seriously hampered the sale of the property; he fur-
ther observed that a lender could not reasonably assume that the
sale impaired the lender's security. Thus, he concluded, automatic
enforcement of such clauses unlawfully restrained alienation of
property.
Wellen kamp had a profound impact on the housing market.
With the present housing shortage and interest rates at historic
highs, the ability of buyers to assume existing loans at lower rates
of interest has proved a significant factor in facilitating real estate
transactions. At the same time, commercial lenders, deprived of
their ability to seize upon every sale to accelerate the existing loan
and to make a new loan with additional charges and higher inter-
est, have turned to alternative financing devices such as variable
rate mortgages. At this time, four years after Wellenkamp, the
shock waves of that decision have not yet dissipated, but it is pos-
sible to foresee that the final result may be a form of real estate
financing fairer to both borrower and lender than the pre-Wel-
lenkamp trust deed with its automatic due-on-sale clause.
2. 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978).
3. 61 Cal. 2d 311, 392 P.2d 265, 38 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1964).
4. 5 Cal. 3d 864, 489 P.2d 1113, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971).
5. 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974).
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Turning to the subject of criminal law, I note the decision of
Justice Manuel in People v. Jimenez.8 Resolving a conflict among
the courts of appeal, which in turn stemmed from inconsistent de-
cisions of the United States Supreme Court, he concluded that
under California law the prosecution must prove a confession vol-
untary beyond a reasonable doubt.
Subsequently, in People v. Zelinski,7 Justice Manuel held that
when a private security guard effects a citizen's arrest and searches
the arrestee, that search is subject to the protective provisions of
article I, section 13 of the California Constitution-the California
counterpart of the fourth amendment. The issue was curiously
reminiscent of the state action issue in Justice Manuel's earlier
opinion in Garfinkle v. Superior Court.8 Justice Manuel carefully
distinguished Garfinkle in a footnote in Zelinski. Noting the in-
creasing importance of private security personnel to property pro-
tection and law enforcement, he maintained that such personnel in
undertaking a citizen's arrest carry out a state function and pose
the same risk to the privacy rights of Californians as regular police
officers. Evidence seized by private security guards, he concluded,
must be subject to the same limitations on admissibility.
Justice Manuel wrote another noteworthy decision in the fiqld
of criminal procedure: Harris v. Superior Court,9 which indicates
that judges in appointing counsel should give preference to counsel
familiar with the case who enjoy the confidence of the defendants.
Finally, I note a number of significant opinions of Justice Ma-
nuel in other areas of law: two carefully crafted decisions on land
use law and policy: County of Los Angeles v. Berk1" and Furey v.
City of Sacramento," his politically important decision in In re
Governorship, 12 which defined the judicial appointment powers of
the Governor and Lieutenant Governor; his analysis of the law of
libel in Forsher v. Bugliosi;18 and two recent decisions resolving
complicated problems involving the ownership and division of real
6. 21 Cal. 3d 595, 580 P.2d 672, 147 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1978).
7. 24 Cal. 3d 357, 594 P.2d 1000, 155 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1979).
8. 21 Cal. 3d 268, 578 P.2d 925, 146 Cal. Rptr. 208 (1978).
9. 19 Cal. 3d 786, 567 P.2d 750, 140 CaL Rptr. 318 (1977).
10. 26 Cal. 3d 201, 605 P.2d 381, 161 Cal. Rptr. 742 (1980).
11. 24 Cal. 3d 862, 598 P.2d 844, 157 Cal. Rptr. 684 (1979).
12. 26 Cal. 3d 110, 603 P.2d 1357, 160 Cal. Rptr. 760 (1979).
13. 26 Cal. 3d 792, 608 P.2d 716, 163 Cal. Rptr. 628 (1980).
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property in dissolution actions: In re Marriage of Moore14 and In
re Marriage of Lucas.1 5
Justice Manuel's opinions reflect his patience, his careful scru-
tiny of the cases, his recognition that his function as a judge was
circumscribed, that he was not free to write into opinions his per-
sonal beliefs but that he was bound by the precedents. I can think
of two situations that confirm this observation.
I would hazard the guess that he encountered emotional diffi-
culty in upholding the constitutionality of the death penalty. He
knew, of course, that the penalty falls heavily and even unfairly
upon blacks; yet he must have put aside his feelings in the face of
legal reasons which he held to be decisive. On the other hand, he
believed that the lack of opportunity for employment, which is un-
doubtedly a major factor in the incidence of crime of all minorities,
could be alleviated by special programs for employment of minori-
ties and by consideration of race as a factor in selecting applicants
for admission to professional schools. Here he could uphold such
programs as lawful because they were sustained by the precedents.
My memories of Wiley likewise reflect the patience, thought-
fulness, and warm understanding of this humble man. From a col-
lage of recollections I see Wiley at our conference table on a
Wednesday carefully and fully explaining a case to which he has
been assigned; I see him at oral argument in the blue-walled court-
room leaning over the bench eagerly and vigorously questioning
counsel; I hear Wiley at lunch in the State's drab cafeteria telling
me how much he enjoyed the debate among the justices at confer-
ence, which, in passing, he declares to be the highlight of the week;
I see Wiley in my office so solicitously and politely explaining to
me exactly why he cannot accept a position I have taken in a circu-
lating opinion; I see the faces of hundreds at the funeral shaken
with grief but inspired by the example of this man who had risen
from the simplest of origins to a role of importance, which he per-
formed so modestly and so nobly.
Mathew 0. Tobriner*
14. 28 Cal. 3d 366, 618 P.2d 208, 168 Cal. Rptr. 662 (1980).
15. 27 Cal. 3d 808, 614 P.2d 285, 166 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1980).
* Associate Justice, California Supreme Court.
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Wiley Manuel was my friend.
For some 33 years, we shared a friendship which extended to many
activities, organizations and events.
We were students together at Cal.
We were contemporaries in law school-
Wiley was at Hastings,
I was at Boalt.
We shared a love for our common profession-the law.
We worked together in NAACP, Boy Scouts,
Charles Houston Bar Association,
California Association of Black Lawyers
and the National Bar Association's Judicial Council:
We were brothers in Sigma Pi Phi Fraternity.
We served together as judges on the Superior Court of Ala-
meda County.
We shared the fellowship and community of St. Paschal
Church-though I must regretfully admit that my devotion
never ran as deep as his.
Our families enjoyed regular and friendly contacts.
And we shared, over the years and today, many common
friendships and acquaintances.
Yes, Wiley was my friend-and that is how I will remember him.
But Wiley was more than that; he was a man of all the people.
He was at once a truly gentle man-and yet, at the same time,
he was a truly great man.
To know him was to like him.
To know him well was to respect him.
All who knew him admired his outstanding human qualities:
His devotion to his beloved wife, Eleanor, to his fine family
and to his many, many relatives and friends;
His unmatched capacity to love, to care and to serve;
His deep and profound ability to understand, to reason and
to resolve;
His great intellect and his keen wit; and above all,
His genuine humility.
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He was admired too, for
His unconquerable determination to overcome all obstacles,
and continuously to improve himself and to achieve.
Wiley was a man of many outstanding accomplishments. Those ac-
complishments have been widely and frequently chronicled in
other places and publications. They need not be repeated here.
Wiley refused to allow himself to be victimized by race, poverty or
any other adversity, and he persistently refused to tolerate or to
participate in victimization of any other person for any reason.
As an Associate Justice on our State Supreme Court, Wiley was a
man
-of wisdom and vision;
-of prudence and reason;
-of fairness and justice.
His opinions showed knowledge of the law, understanding of
human events, and a passion for justice, fairness, freedom and
equality under law.
His passing is a great loss to all of us.
On an occasion such as this, the hearts of those who are left behind
are usually filled with sadness. And if this is true today-that we,
the friends, the people-of Wiley Manuel have hearts filled with
sadness,-then I ask each of you to try with me to realize and to
remember that Wiley Manuel's life was agreat gift to all of us. We
were fortunate to have had him among us for so long a time. We
were fortunate to have known him, and to have shared in some
part of his life.
That realization should help to fill our hearts with some feeling of
appreciation and gratitude.
That is how I want to remember Wiley Manuel-for the goodness
that he brought to all of us.
And, after so full and good a life, it is my profound belief and my
fervent hope and prayer that he is now in his rightful place-at
rest and at peace with his Maker.
Allen E. Broussard*
Presiding Judge, Alameda County Superior Court.
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There is a crushing sadness in our lives when a gifted man is
taken from us before his time. There is a sense of the tragic in our
profession when such a man, blessed with a noble intellect, the
purest integrity and an unquenchable love of the law, is suddenly
wrenched from a career of service to which he has dedicated him-
self completely. The loss is beyond measure as the fires of his mind
and heart, now extinguished, are beyond measure. Nevertheless the
record of achievement remains-an embodiment, to borrow a
phrase of Holmes, of "the most impressive form of our belief that
to act with enthusiasm and faith is the condition of acting
greatly."1 Such a man was Justice Wiley W. Manuel, Associate Jus-
tice of the Supreme Court of California.
Wiley Manuel came to Hastings in the fall of 1950, a product
of the Berkeley public schools and a graduate of the University of
California at Berkeley. In a law school fashioned by the genius of
Dean David E. Snodgrass and adorned with such faculty names as
Vold, Bogert, Fraser, McBaine and Basye, he quickly distinguished
himself as an outstanding student. In his last year he served as
Editor-in-Chief of the Hastings Law Journal. He graduated at the
top of his class in 1953, with awards of membership in the Order of
the Coif and the Thurston Society. There followed twenty-three
-years of extraordinary service in the California Attorney General's
Office, his selection as Chief Assistant Attorney General, his ap-
pointment as Judge of the Alameda County Superior Court, and
finally his elevation to the Supreme Court.
Throughout all these years Justice Manuel ideally personified
the scholarly lawyer in public service. An able trial and appellate
advocate for the State, a recognized authority on administrative
law, an author of numerous articles on administrative law practice
in California, a participant in various programs of the Continuing
Education of the Bar, he exhibited a love of the law which tran-
scended his conscientious discharge of official responsibilities and
his abiding interest in bar association and community activities. It
seemed almost inevitable that he would bring to the highest court
of our state not only this professionalism and dedication but along
1. THE OCCASIONAL SPEECHES OF JUSTICE OLIrER WENDELL HOLMES 6 (1962).
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with them his unique personal qualities of warmth, sensitivity and
compassion-in Justice Cardozo's words "a stream of tendency,
whether you choose to call it philosophy or not, which gives coher-
ence and direction to thought and action. . . an outlook on life, a
conception of social needs, a sense in James' phrase of the total
push and pressure of the cosmos, which when reasons are nicely
balanced, must determine where choice shall fall."
2
It is significant that those closest to Justice Manuel in his offi-
cial and personal life have emphasized his sweetness, gentleness
and humility. It is a fitting accolade. For these qualities after all
are the aspects of love, and as St. Paul wrote to the Romans, "Love
is the fulfilling of law."'
Raymond L. Sullivan*
2. Cardozo, THE NATURE Op THE JuDicmI PROCESS 12 (1921)
3. The Letter of Paul to the Romans 13:10 (Revised Standard Edition).
* Retired Associate Justice, California Supreme Court, Professor of Law, University of
California, Hastings College of the Law.
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